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war existing between the Central Powers of Europe and the United States of America be hereby declared at an end, and expressly reserving to the United States of America her rights and privileges, the members of Congress were taking a necessary step toward ending the war; but they were not taking part in any procedure calculated to remove the causes of war or to preserve peace between the nations. Congress has simply taken a step with reference to the war treaty. The United States Senate on two different occasions took a decided stand with reference to the Paris League of Peace.

It is important that we come out of the fog arising from the confusion at this point. War treaties are war treaties and peace treaties are peace treaties, and never the twain shall meet. America has rendered a service to the world by refusing to become a party to the attempt to mix the oil and water of Versailles. The movement in our government to bring the war to an end will go on. The work will be accomplished as best it can. But there is another movement quite separate and distinct, a movement as old as the beginning of the Greek confederacies and as new as the inside of the front cover of the *ADVOCATE OF PEACE*, a movement in behalf of that justice between nations which shall spell the end of war.

The point here is that we, together with the other nations of the world, have two jobs, each of prime importance: to end the war as best we can; to arrange our international housekeeping for the company that is coming. Finish the fight, and then dress up for the new day.

THE PACIFIC

FOR OVER four centuries the intercommunications of civilization have related particularly to the Atlantic Ocean. The Pacific is now contending for its place in the international sun. This has been increasingly true since we took possession of Hawaii and the Philippines, in 1898. Commerce upon the Pacific increases year by year. The industry of Japan, the awakening of China, the discovery of new resources in South America, the development of western Canada and of the United States, all mean for the future an increasing international intercourse and the multiplication of international problems between our hemisphere and the Orient. These problems relate not only to matters of commerce and finance, but to other and more serious questions relating to peace and war. No future in which we are particularly interested can be said to lie more in the Pacific than in the Atlantic, but the future welfare of nations is inextricably interwoven with the relations of men across our western ocean. Alleged statesmanship

that fails to recognize this patent fact is not statesmanship.

It is not easy to see the problem whole. At this writing there is a protracted discussion within the English Government over the question of renewing the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It is argued there by some that the alliance should be renewed, by others that it should be renewed for one year only, and by still others that nothing should be done in such a direction without the advice and consent of Washington. The British Government is not unmindful that the Pacific problem is larger than a matter of an alliance between Britain and Japan. Just now, as Mr. Nakanishi, of the visiting Japanese Parliamentary delegation to this country, is telling us that Japan has reached the point where foreign policy must be based upon public opinion, and that the people of Japan are interested in foreign affairs as never before, men are pointing out in Britain the necessity for a conference on the relations between the Orient and the Occident, in which Great Britain, the United States, Japan, and China would join. The Japanese Minister of Marine has just said to the Associated Press of America that, should the powers come to a reliable understanding and agree unanimously to limit their armaments, Japan would limit her armaments—indeed, that she would not insist on the completion of her program. The fact that Mr. Chamberlain remarked in the House of Commons that it was undesirable to make a statement with reference to an agreement upon the matter of disarmament because the whole question is under consideration by the Imperial Conference, showed that the diplomats of the countries concerned are hearing from their constituents. This same Mr. Chamberlain had said in his speech on June 17 that he thought it would be found possible to reconcile Great Britain's desire for a perfect understanding and close co-operation with the people of the United States and the continuance of our close and intimate friendship with Japan, and that he was sure it must be the object of the British Government and the governments of the dominions "to secure such confidence, such an understanding, and such co-operation among the great Pacific powers" as might prevent "a new competition in armaments." Mr. Lloyd-George, addressing the Imperial Conference at its opening, on June 20, said Great Britain desired to avoid competition in armaments in the Pacific and emphasized the willingness of the government to discuss the limitation of armaments with the United States. The Japanese National Chamber of Commerce has just adopted a resolution urging that the Japanese Government reduce appropriations for preparations for war, "which are arousing the suspicions of the powers and endangering Japan's future," and declaring that Japan should reach a practical agreement

with the powers regarding disarmament. Mr. A. C. Bedford, speaking formally as the representative of the American delegation to the International Chamber of Commerce in London, declares his judgment to be that the united opinion of business men the world over is in favor of an agreement to limit armament. The Borah resolution has received the approval of both branches of Congress. Thus, whatever the complications, many of which are known only to the ministries, the great cry of the people for some way out of the dangers where guns face guns is being heard. It is well. It will take brains and good will to calm the storm rising on the Pacific.

BARON SHIDEHARA'S STATEMENT

THERE IS an element of special interest in the statement made to the American people by the Japanese Ambassador, Baron Shidehara, in that the statement *was made to the people*. It was not an unheard-of proceeding—witness President Wilson's appeal to the Italians—but it is sufficiently rare to be worthy of comment, especially since it is a tacit recognition upon the part of a government, generally accounted militaristic, of the present power of public opinion and of the necessity to take into account the masses of the people, who pay the price when statesmen blunder in secret. We suspect that it is an evidence of the growing power of democracy in Nippon.

Other than that, there seems to be no especial merit in the document. The people of the United States do not need information that Great Britain plans no attack upon this country in conjunction with Japan. They are happy to believe that, making allowances for all the differences and conflicts of interest between the two great English-speaking nations, there is still a community of interests and of ideals too deep and too strong to be torn asunder by a pact between Britain and Japan. And, if they did not believe that, they still know it would not be to Great Britain's interest to war with Japan against the United States; and they further know the truth of a statement made by an English publication, quoted elsewhere in this number, that should Great Britain side with Japan against the United States in war, the sure result would be to drive away from the mother country every one of the great self-governing dominions and to wreck the British Empire as we know it today. Hence the people of this country may be excused if they regard as somewhat Pickwickian the grave statement of Baron Shidehara, that "any plan designed to remove the possibility of an armed conflict between the United States and Great Britain was, of course, agreeable to Japan."

Nor will the statement of Baron Shidehara as to Japan's attitude toward China make the Baron's contri-

bution to the general discussion especially valuable to the people of the United States. "Japan," says Baron Shidehara, "sincerely wishes for China an early achievement of peace, unity, and stable government. She desires to cultivate her relations with that country along the path of mutual respect and helpfulness. Her vast commercial interests alone, if for no other consideration, point unmistakably to the wisdom of such a policy." All that, and more, by way of assurance to the American people, historically friendly to China, that renewal of the Anglo-Japanese pact will not work hardship and oppression upon the huge and peaceful nation that is Japan's neighbor. The words are excellent and the American people doubtless were glad to read them; but, it may be assumed very safely, with respect to Japan's relations with China, that the American people would prefer works to the most generous words. Looking forward hopefully to evolution peace-ward, from the concentration of statesmen's minds the world over on the Pacific problem, they will receive cheerfully the message from the distinguished Baron as it deals with China, but they will shrewdly ask for something more tangible than the message. They cannot accept such words at face value while representatives of China and Korea protest in bitter terms to Great Britain's statesmen against Japan's policy in the Far East.

So, appreciative unquestionably of the significance of the Ambassador's direct appeal to American opinion, with its friendly references to relations between the United States and Japan, and its assurance that the Anglo-Japanese pact contemplates no alignment against the United States; appreciative, also, of the significance of the Ambassador's assurance to American opinion of Japan's friendship for China; appreciative of all the direct statements and all the implications of a peaceful purpose in Japan, the people of the United States still will find the principal value of the Shidehara statement in the contribution it makes to the principle of public discussion by diplomats of international problems. It brings nothing concrete to the friendly relations between the United States and Great Britain and it brings nothing concrete to the relief of those Asiatic peoples whom most of America believe to have suffered under an unjust oppression.

OUR FULMINATING ADMIRAL

WE HAVE two objections to Rear-Admiral Sims. We said nothing of his recent outburst in England, for we felt that to be the duty of our government. When Secretary Denby publicly reprimanded this outspoken gentleman, we agreed with the Admiral, that he had "spilt the beans," and with our government, that he